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Whose Constitution Is It Anyway?
The Executives' Discretion to




On September 8, 2010, the California Supreme Court declared
that Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and Attorney General Jerry
Brown need not defend their state's freshly amended constitution.
The court's decision was brief.2 This ruling, however, may end the
decade long political and legal struggle over same-sex marriage in
California.
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law; B.A. 2007 Brown University, American History and Religious Studies. The author
would like to thank Professor Elizabeth Hillman, Julia Heming, and the editors of the
Constitutional Law Quarterly for their guidance. He would also like to thank his family
for being exactly who they are.
1. Beckley v. Schwarzenegger, Case No. S186072, Sept. 8, 2011, appeal dismissed,
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/disposition.cfm?dist=O&doc-id=1
954 64 1
&docno=S186072 (California Supreme Court denying petition for review). See also
Letter Brief of Respondent-Appellee Attorney General Jerry Brown at 1, Beckley v.
Schwarzenegger, No. S186072 (Cal. Sept. 8, 2010) 2010 WL 3874716.
2. Letter Brief of Respondent-Appellee Attorney General Jerry Brown at 1,
Beckley, No. S186072. Joshua Beckley, a proponent of Proposition 8 petitioned for a writ
of mandamus to compel Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and Attorney General Jerry
Brown to file a notice of appeal to the District Court's decision striking down of
Proposition 8. The decision was economical, only stating: "The petition for review
denied." Id.
3. In 2004, San Francisco began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.
These actions were promptly halted because existing state law forbid same-sex marriage.
Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 33 Cal. 4th 1055, 1105-06 (2004). In 2008,
the existing prohibitions on same-sex marriage were ruled invalid under the California
Constitution. In Re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 829 (2008). This ruling energized
opponents of same-sex marriage who led the movement to pass Proposition 8. CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7.5. Initial efforts to invalidate Proposition 8 as an impermissible revision
of the California Constitution failed. Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 411 (2009). A
[327]
Almost two years earlier the people of California, acting through
the state's system of direct democracy, adopted Proposition 8: The
Marriage Protection Act.4 This proposition added section 7.5 to
article I of the California Constitution and so enshrined marriage as a
right solely reserved for opposite-sex couples.! This alteration to the
California Constitution would not endure without legal challenge.6
On August 4, 2010, the United States District Court ruled, in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, that Proposition 8 violated the United States
Constitution.! One week later, Attorney General Jerry Brown, a
named defendant in the case and the government official charged
with supervising all legal matters in which California is interested,
announced that he would not appeal the decision to strike down
Proposition 8.8 Governor and fellow defendant Arnold
Schwarzenegger would come to the same conclusion.! These refusals
from the pinnacle of government to defend the new amendment
were, according to the California Supreme Court, appropriate
expressions of executive discretion."o
Not all shared this view of executive discretion. Pacific Justice
Institute lawyer Kevin Snider, whose organization filed the
unsuccessful suit to compel Governor Schwarzenegger to appeal,
characterized the California Supreme Court's decision as a bald
challenge in federal court fared better, as the District Court found that the ban on same-
sex marriage violated constitutional guarantees of Equal Protection and Due Process.
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). During the trial
court stage of Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the citizen groups that promoted Proposition 8
were allowed to intervene and argue for the constitutionality of the initiative. Id. at 928.
Currently the issue of theses proponents' standing in appellate proceedings is under
review by the California Supreme Court. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1196-
1197 (9th Cir. 2011) (certifying question to the California Supreme Court).
4. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. The language of Proposition 8 is not ambiguous: "Only
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California." Id.
5. Id.
6. See supra note 3.
7. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003.
8. Attorney General's Opp'n Emergency Mot. for Stay Pending Appeal at 3, Perry
v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. August 6, 2010), 2010 WL 3065298;
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12511 (West 2011) (the attorney general is in charge of all legal
matters in which the state is interested).
9. Letter Brief of Respondent-Appellee Arnold Schwarzenegger at 1, Beckley v.
Schwarzenegger, No. S186072, 2010 WL 3874716, at *1 (Cal. Sept. 8, 2010), available
at http://www.lgbtpov.com/2010/09/developing-california-supreme-court-wants-governor-
and-attorney-general-to-explain-themselves-on-prop-8/.
10. Beckley, No. S186072, 2010 WL 3874716, at *1.
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affront to the democratic process." "When the people peacefully
enact a constitutional provision and the attorney general refuses to
give them meaningful review in the federal judiciary, then you have a
veto by the executive branch. That is a constitutional crisis, usurping
the power of the people." 2
This complaint did not stem from a desire to witness the
Attorney General's elocution in court. Instead in Beckley v.
Schwarzenegger, the proponents of Proposition 8 prayed only for a
writ requiring the Attorney General to issue a notice of appeal which
would allow them to intervene and continue to advocate for the
initiative's validity in appellate proceedings. Currently the
California Supreme Court is reviewing the question of the
proponents' standing to appeal on behalf of Proposition 8.14 With no
government official defending the initiative, there today exists a
distinct possibility that the District Court's findings of
unconstitutionality in Perry v. Schwarzenegger will remain. While
this issue is not settled, the proponents will have a difficult case to
make as a previous United States Supreme Court decision suggests
that private citizens do not have standing to defend an initiative in
court." The potential for the legal controversy over Proposition 8 to
suddenly end without further appellate proceedings did not only
perturb the initiative's proponents. Even the Los Angeles Times'
11. Bob Egelko, Court Won't Force State to Defend Proposition 8, S.F. CHRON,
September 3, 2010, http://www.sfgate.comlcgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/09/02/BAPN1F7
SPG.DTL&tsp=1.
12. Id.
13. Letter Brief of Attorney General Jerry Brown at 4, Beckley v. Schwarzenegger,
2010 WL 3874716 (Cal. September 8, 2010) (No. S186072).
14. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1196-1197 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16696)
(order certifying question to the California Supreme Court). The question of proponent
standing is fascinating, but not the subject of this brief note. For a more thorough
discussion of the topic see Heather Elliot Congress's Inability to Solve Standing Problems,
91 B.U.L. REV. 159, 178-80 (2011).
15. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 66 (1997); Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) ("[S]tatus as an intervenor below, whether permissive or as
of right, does not confer standing sufficient to keep the case alive."). If the California
Supreme Court finds that the proponents have standing this decision will most likely be
highly dependent on the particular fact that the proponents supported Proposition 8
throughout the state court proceedings and this decision will not set a precedent
substantially weakening the impact of an executive decision to not defend. Furthermore,
the California Supreme Court's decision only serves as an advisory opinion for the federal
courts which will ultimately decide the issue of Article III standing in Proposition 8
litigation. Last, if the proponents are ultimately given standing to pursue their appeal they
will have to do at their own cost as California's executives have ultilized their discretionary
abilities to abandon the defense of Proposition 8.
Editorial Board, which opposed Proposition 8, saw the refusal to
defend the amendment as an inappropriate denial of "the voters'
right to expect the state to defend its laws.""
These criticisms, while superficially appealing, ignore an essential
component of California's constitutional arrangement. Although the
initiative may reflect a "theory that all power of government
ultimately resides in the people,"" California's governors and
attorneys general do not always treat winning initiatives as
sacrosanct." As one perceptive account of California's system of
direct democracy points out, "every winning initiative gives
government actors an opportunity to make implementation and
enforcement decisions."" It is true that neither attorneys general nor
governors may repeal an initiative or entirely refuse to enforce an
initiative until an appellate court deems the law invalid.20 Still, the
executives' discretion to refuse to defend an initiative in court, power
to interpret provisions, and ability to appoint those who will carry out
the law confers on governors and attorneys general a substantial
ability to alter the voice of direct democracy.2'
Be it through a bold refusal to stand behind an initiative in court
or the subtle machinations of interpretation, these executive actions
raise valid concerns about public officials' accountability to the
electorate.22 There is, however, another side to this story. While the
California Constitution grants the people an expansive ability to
democratically initiate laws and elect officials, the fundamental
constitutional theory of separation of powers permits executive
officers wide latitude to practice their discretionary duties in the
16. Editorial, Defending Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com
/2010/sep /08/opinion/la-ed-prop8-20100908.
17. Associated Home Builders of the East Bay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d
582, 591 (1976).
18. ELISABETH R. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE: How STATE
GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY 4 (2001).
19. Id.
20. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) (government officials may not repeal initiatives);
Lockyer, 33 Cal. 4th at 1100-01 (government official may not refuse to enforce a law in the
absence of an appellate decision that a law is invalid).
21. GERBER, supra note 18, at 4.
22. Michael T. Brady, Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of
Statutes, 92 YALE L.J. 970, 974-75 (1983) (arguing that an executive's choice not to defend
a statute "could allow the Executive to invalidate specific provisions of statutes and
thereby exercise indirectly that which the Constitution denies him directly: a post-
enactment item veto").
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manner they see fit.' Defense in court is one such manifestation of
these duties. While not an everyday occurrence, there is indeed a
well-established tradition of governors, attorneys general and even
presidents who have refused to defend new laws because of their own
doubts about the enactment's constitutionality.24
Executive officers do not, however, wield this discretion to
defend in a political vacuum. While the propriety of an executive's
discretionary decisions are not a matter for judicial review, these
actions can still be checked by "an informed civically militant
electorate" which is able to express "an aroused popular conscience
that sears the conscience of the people's representatives."25
attorney general or governor decides to buck the will of the electorate
and refuse to defend the people's initiative in court, he or she is
forced to make this decision publicly and then reckon with whatever
political ramifications result from such idealistic stance. This political
check is, on the other hand, obscured when California's executives
take the alternative path and combat winning initiatives through
surreptitious means of interpretation or appointment, safe from the
glare of democratic accountability.
The executives' discretionary ability to alter and perhaps even
abrogate winning initiatives is wide. It is not apparent whether
California's electorate or executive officers hold the reigns to
constitutional change in the state. This brief note hopes to shine a
little clarity onto this question. Part I will first explore direct
democracy's historical origins as a movement to provide the people
an opportunity to legislate without the interference of government
officials. Next, this section will demonstrate that the initiative gives
the people an effective method of implementing their desired policies
into state law. Parts II and III will examine the constitutional
propriety and extent of the attorney general and governor's discretion
to refuse to defend in court a popularly enacted initiative. Part IV
will show how California's attorneys general and governors also limit
winning initiatives through subtle, yet effective, means of
interpretation and appointment. Ultimately, Part V will conclude
23. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(a) (providing that an initiative that gains majority
approval becomes law); CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("The powers of state government are
legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one power may
not exercise either of the others except as permitted by [California's] Constitution.").
24. See e.g., United States v. Seminole County Sch. Dist., 553 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1977);
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986); Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S.
574 (1983).
25. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
that an attorney general or governor's open refusal to defend an
initiative in court provides the electorate with a prime opportunity to
hold their executives accountable for neglecting the will of the
people.
I. Power to the People: The Origins and Scope of
Direct Democracy in California
A. The Progressive Movement and the Roots of the Initiative
California's adoption of direct democracy came as a result of the
political victories of the Progressive Movement.26 The origins of the
Progressive Movement in California reveal a long-held fascination
with empowering the electorate to legislate through direct
democracy.2 In the words of an early Progressive leader, public
opinion was "a jury that could not be fixed." 28  Historically, the
Progressives emerged as a group of middle-class reformers protesting
new concentrations of power in the rapidly industrializing United
States of the early twentieth century. 29  The Progressives were
ecumenical in their scorn for these emerging monoliths, opposing
both organized labor and monopolistic corporations.30
In California, the Progressives reserved the bulk of their ire for
one particular target.31 The Southern Pacific-Central Pacific Railroad
had, since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, dominated
California.3 2 The ever-looming hand of Southern Pacific extended far
into politics so that "[s]carcely a vote was cast in either house that did
not show some aspect of Southern Pacific ownership, petty
26. JOHN M. ALLSWANG, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA,
1898-1998, at 8 (2000).
27. Id.
28. JOE MATTHEWS & MARK PAUL, CALIFORNIA CRACK UP: HOW REFORM
BROKE THE GOLDEN STATE AND How WE CAN Fix IT 25 (2010).
29. GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVES 89-91 (Quadrangle
Books, 1963) (Most of the movement's leaders were either professionals or businessmen
who were, in the parlance of the time, "well fixed.").
30. Id. at 91.
31. Id.
32. JOSEPH R. GRODIN, CALVIN R. MASSEY AND RICHARD B. CUNNINGHAM, THE
CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE, 10 (1993). By the 1870s,
Southern Pacific owned eighty-five percent of the state's railroad lines and was both the
largest landowner and employer in California. Id. This power did not breed good
stewardship. Southern Pacific charged arbitrary freight rates, favored certain merchants
and threatened new towns with bypass if they did not pay tribute. Id. at 16.
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vengeance, or legislative blackmail."33 Early attempts at hedging the
power of this monopoly failed as even the Railroad Commission,
established by constitutional amendment in 1879, quickly came under
the grasp of Southern Pacific.3 4
Facing the omnipotent Southern Pacific on one flank and
organized labor on the other, the Progressives turned to the power of
the individual citizen in the hopes of dethroning vested interests from
California's government." Progressive leader Marshall Stimson
expressed these sentiments well when he urged voters that they could
either have "a government controlled by corporate interests,
Socialism, or if we have the courage, unselfishness and determination,
a government of individuals."36 Another leader saw Progressivism as
the very means to escape the political affiliations, which flowed from
class identifications. Indeed the Progressive would be a Californian
who "believes in nationalism, in individual citizenship, and in the
whole people, not in any class as a unit of government."38 This
movement would be "in other words, the twentieth century evolution
of democracy.""
This evolution reached its apex in 1911 when newly elected
California Governor Hiram Johnson proposed twenty-three
amendments, including provisions allowing for direct democracy, to
the California Constitution.40 The initiative, referendum, and recall of
elected officials sparked debate throughout California. 41  Grove
Johnson, Governor Hiram Johnson's own father and himself a
42
politician, was no fan of direct democracy. With an air of
foreboding, the elder Johnson warned that legislating through the
popular vote would only lead to political mischief. "The voice of the
people is not the voice of God ... for the voice of the people sent
Jesus to the cross." 43
33. MOWRY, supra note 29, at 63.
34. GRODIN, supra note 32, at 17.
35. MOWRY, supra note 29, at 91.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 104.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. ALLSWANG, supra note 26, at 17 (The proposed amendments allowing for the
initiative and referendum passed by a vote of 71-0 in the Assembly and 35-1 in the
Senate.).
41. MOWRY, supra note 29, at 140.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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Appeals by Grove Johnson and other foes of direct democracy
had little effect. Countering their opponents' sneers, the Progressives
wisely presented these reforms as a means to safeguard the will of the
people from the corrupting influence of established government." In
the subsequent special election the Progressives won the day, as
seventy-six percent of Californians voted to implement the initiative
into the California Constitution.45 California's experiment with direct
democracy had begun.46
B. The Initiative Gives California's Voters a Simple and Expansive
Means to Implement New Laws
The initiative has given the people of California great latitude to
change California law. This function of direct democracy allows the
electorate to inject either a new statute or constitutional amendment
into California law.47 The basic mechanism of creating a new
California law through the initiative is relatively simple and has
witnessed little alteration since the days of the Progressives.48
To start, the proponents of an initiative write the text of the
proposed statute or amendment.49  The Attorney General then
receives this proposal and prepares an official title and summary of
the provisions in the initiative.so To gain a place on an upcoming
ballot, the initiative's proponents must record the signatures of at
44. Karl Manheim & Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power
in California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1188 (1998) (citing Constitutional Amendment
22, in California Ballot Pamphlet, Special Election (Oct. 11, 1911) (Comments of Lee C.
Gates, Senator, 34th District, and William C. Clark, Assemblyman, 59th District) (This
ballot pamphlet urged voters to adopt the amendments allowing for direct democracy so
to "safeguard which the people should retain for themselves to supplement the work of
the legislature by initiating those measures which the legislature either viciously or
negligently fails or refuses to enact; and to hold the legislature in check, and to veto or
negative such measures as it may viciously or negligently enact.").
45. ALLSWANG, supra note 26, at 77.
46. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, 409
(University of North Carolina Press, 1969). This preference for direct democracy in
California contrasts deeply with the constitutional model envisioned by the framers of the
United States Constitution. Indeed, many of the framers were primarily motivated with
constituting a government that avoided the specter of "democratic despotism." Id.
47. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b).
48. Karl Manheim & Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the Initiative Power
in California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1188-89 (1998).
49. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b). See also LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF
CALIFORNIA, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA: A LEGACY LOST? 20-22
(League of Women Voters of California, 1987) (providing a extremely detailed summary
of the process a proposed initiative must undergo to become law).
50. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(d).
334 [Vol. 39:1
Fall 2011] DISCRETION TO DEFEND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 335
least five percent of the total votes cast in the last gubernatorial
election for a new statute, and eight percent if the initiative is to be a
constitutional amendment." When the proponents of an initiative
meet these requirements, then the California Secretary of State must
put the proposal on the ballot.52 An initiative that can next gain the
support of the bare majority of the electorate is enshrined as the law
of the state.
Few restrictions limit the subject matter that a popularly
implemented initiative may cover. First, an initiative must only
pertain to a single subject." Second, an initiative may also only
amend, rather than revise, the California Constitution." Last, like
any state law, an initiative must not violate the protections
guaranteed by the United States Constitution." Since the
implementation of direct democracy, California's electorate has taken
advantage of the system and used it to force a motley group of
propositions into state law. The people of California can indeed
thank direct democracy for the allowance of medical marijuana,
limitations on property tax increases, the end of public affirmative
action, and new standards for confining egg-laying hens.
51. Id.
52. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(c).
53. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(a).
54. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d).
55. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-4 (a winning initiative can revise the California
Constitution if it is accompanied by the support of two thirds of the Legislature).
56. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967) (striking down an initiative for
violating the Equal Protection Clause). There have been interesting explorations of the
proper deference the judiciary should show initiatives. See, e.g., Julian Eule, Judicial
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1504, 1507 (1990). (less judicial restraint is
required when reviewing initiatives); Patrick L. Baude, A Comment on the Evolution of
Direct Democracy in Western State Constitutions, 29 N.M.L. REV. 343, 352 (1998) (both
initiative and legislative lawmaking concerning divisive social issued derive from equally
nondeliberative sources).
57. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2011) (codifying Proposition
215); (CAL. CONST. art XIII(A), § 1 (codifying Proposition 14); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31
(codifying Proposition 209); CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 25996 (West 2011)
(codifying Proposition 2).
II. The Executive's Discretion to Defend an Initiative in Court
A. An Executive's Decision to Defend an Initiative is Discretionary and
Protected from Judicial Compulsion by Constitutional Theories of
Separation of Powers
Although California's electorate has great power to initiate new
law through direct democracy, the State's Governor and Attorney
General still have discretion to choose to defend this enactment in
court. The California Constitution, like its federal counterpart,
separates the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
government." Since the genesis of American constitutional law,
courts have been loath to compel coordinate branches of government
to perform discretionary duties in a certain manner. 9 Indeed the
most venerable of all American opinions, Marbury v. Madison, held
that a court may only issue a writ of mandamus to compel action by
an executive officer if he fails to perform an explicit ministerial duty."
"Where the head of a department acts in a case, in which executive
discretion is to be exercised; in which he is the mere organ of
executive will; it is again repeated, that any application to a court to
control, in any respect, his conduct, would be rejected without
hesitation."61 California has embraced this fundamental principle of
constitutional law. Subsequently, its courts only issue writs of
mandamus when government officials violate a distinct ministerial
duty derived from an identifiable statute.62
B. There Exists No Explicit Statutory of Constitutional Provision
Requiring California's Attorney General or Governor to
Defend an Initiative
The California Constitution and Government Codes dictate the
ministerial duties that the Attorney General and Governor must
58. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3. Interestingly enough, the United States Constitution
never mentions separation of powers explicitly, but courts have implemented this view of
government through its text and structure. Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A
Theory of California's Separation of Powers, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1079, 1126 (2004).
59. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 171 (1803).
60. Marbury 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 171.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California, 92 Cal. App. 4th 113, 138 (2001)
(Discretion, on the other hand, is the power conferred on public functionaries to act
officially according to the dictates of their own judgment.); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1085
(West 2010); California Teachers Assn. v. Ingwerson, 46 Cal. App. 4th 860, 865 (1996)
(Mandamus will also lie to correct an abuse of discretion by an official acting in an
administrative capacity).
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perform. The provisions outlining the Governor's duties do not in
any manner dictate a duty to defend an initiative in court.63 The role
of the Attorney General is more controversial, as this executive
officer is indeed in charge of all legal matters involving the state.6 4 In
whole, however, neither the plain language nor any judicial
interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision requires the
Attorney General to defend an initiative in court. Instead, these
various provisions grant the Attorney General wide discretion to act
61how he sees fit during litigation.
Article V, section 13 of the California Constitution defines the
Attorney General as "the chief law officer of the state" whose "duty
it is to see that the laws of the state are uniformly and adequately
enforced."" Cases interpreting this provision have not identified any
ministerial obligation for the Attorney General to take any specific
position in litigation.
In People v. Honig, for example, a criminal defendant claimed
that the Attorney General lacked authority to prosecute his case.
The Honig court rejected this contention, finding that article V,
section 13 "vests the Attorney General with broad discretion in
deciding when to prosecute" and "accordingly, if the court may
review the Attorney General's decision at all, it certainly may not
interfere with that decision in the absence of a showing of a manifest
abuse of discretion."69 Similarly, other California courts have found
that the Attorney General "has the power to file any civil action
which he deems necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the state
and the protection of public rights and interests."o Although
California courts have yet to directly address the obligation of the
Attorney General to defend a state law under article V, section 13,
they have clearly maintained that the California Constitution grants
63. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1 (This provision states that the governor is the supreme
executive in California, whose obligation is to see that the laws are faithfully executed, it
plainly does not imply a universal obligation to defend.).
64. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
65. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13; CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12511, 12512 (West 2010).
66. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
67. Indeed most of the cases discussing article V, section 13 have concerned the
relationship between local district attorneys and the attorney general. See e.g., People v.
Dehle, 166 Cal. App. 4th 1480 (2008).
68. People v. Honig, 48 Cal. App. 4th 289, 353 (1996).
69. Id. at 355.
70. People v. New Penn Mines, Inc., 212 Cal. App. 2d 667, 671 (1963).
the Attorney General wide discretion to decide whether to
participate in litigation.
The California Government Code further identifies the Attorney
General's responsibilities. Like the relevant constitutional provision,
these codes grant the Attorney General the prerogative to decide to
defend a law." California Government Code section 12512 provides
that the "Attorney General shall attend the Supreme Court and
prosecute or defend all causes to which the State, or any State officer
is a party in his or her official capacity."7 2 The California Supreme
Court has interpreted this duty broadly."
The case of D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners,
demonstrates that Attorney General may decline to represent the
state when he believes its enactments violate the federal
constitution." In D'Amico, Attorney General Evelle Younger came
to the independent conclusion that the position of the California
Medical Board violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution." Subsequently, the Attorney General removed
himself from the case." The California Supreme Court endorsed this
action." The D'Amico court held the Attorney General may, while
discharging his duty to defend the state under Government Code
section 12512, make a legal determination that the state's position is
not acceptable and cease to defend it. Indeed, the California
Government Code anticipates that the Attorney General may act on
that authority by specifically allowing government agencies to retain
private counsel if the Attorney General exercises his discretion to not
defend." Like the other statutory and constitutional provisions which
define the Attorney General's role, section 12512 does not constrain
the Attorney General with any strict ministerial duty to defend. 9
71. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12511, 12512 (West 2011).
72. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12512 (West 2011).
73. D'Amico v. Bd. of Med. Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 21 (1974).
74. Id. at 15.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 13.
77. Id. at 15.
78. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11040 (West 2011). Initiative proponents, unlike the
California Medical Board in D'Amico, may very well not have standing to promote their
favored propositions. See supra note 14.
79. Currently, State Senator Tom Harmon is promoting the Ballot Box Defense Act.
This bill would alter the California Government Code and force the Attorney General to
defend a winning initiative from legal challenges. If the attorney general were to be
disqualified from the case, then the Act would allow the proponents of an initiative to
[Vol. 39:1338 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Fall 2011] DISCRETION TO DEFEND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 339
Government Code section 12511 also does not mandate that the
Attorney General defend a state law. This section states that the
Attorney General "has charge, as attorney, of all legal matters in
which the State is interested ... ."8 A plain reading of the phrase
"has charge" in section 12511 demonstrates that the Attorney
General's discretionary powers during litigation are expansive." The
code's particular use of the phrase "has charge" does not imply
supervision over the Attorney General's decisions in court. Indeed to
have charge is to be literally entrusted with the onus to act in the
manner one sees fit.' Not surprisingly, case law interpreting section
12511 has also demonstrated that the Attorney General is not
hemmed in by a strict ministerial duty to defend."
Even when the Attorney General writes an advisory opinion
supporting a certain legal position, under California Government
Code section 12519, he still may not be compelled to support that
position as a defendant in court. In State of California v. Superior
Court of San Diego County, Attorney General Jack Van de Kamp
successfully appealed a trial court's order to compel his inclusion as a
defendant in a lawsuit after he composed an advisory opinion that
was contrary to the plaintiff's position.
For the California Court of Appeal, the trial court's order to
include the Attorney General in the case was no less than "a trespass
upon the internal management and policy decisions of the Attorney
General's office" and seemed to be "perilously close to the brink of
unwarranted interference in violation of constitutional mandate."
Subsequently, the Court of Appeal liberated the Attorney General as
an unwilling defendant because "a court cannot order a public officer
to do something unless that officer has a plain duty to do it."" It is
defend their handiwork in court. While this Act may end a controversy like that which
arose over the defense of Proposition 8 it is not yet the law. S.B. 617, 2009 Leg. Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2009).
80. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 12511 (West 2011).
81. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 377 (Merriam-Webster
1996).
82. Id.
83. See e.g., Pierce v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 2d 759, 761-62 (1934) (holding that the
attorney general has the power to file any civil action or proceeding directly involving the
rights and interests of the state, or which he deems necessary for the enforcement of the
laws of the state, the preservation of order, and the protection of public rights and
interests).
84. Id. at 396.
85. Id. at 397-98.
86. Id.
evident, from both statute and case law that the Attorney General
does not have a duty to defend."
C. Modern Notions of Executive Powers Have Expanded the Ability of
Governors and Attorneys Generals to Refuse to Defend a Law
Without Abusing Their Discretion
Although not ordinary practice, executive officers at both the
state and federal levels regularly exercise the discretion to refuse to
defend their jurisdictions' own laws.8 Traditionally government
counsel have been cautious in utilizing their discretion and only
refused to support a law in court when there was no reasonable
argument that an enactment was constitutional.89 A prime example of
government counsel utilizing the discretion to defend under a narrow
interpretation of this power occurred in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital.' In this case, the United States refused to defend
a separate-but-equal hospital financing provision owing to the fact the
one year earlier the United States Supreme Court had declared that
state-sponsored racial discrimination was "foreclosed as an issue."91
Modern notions of executive discretion are more expansive and
allow executives wider latitude to combat laws without abusing their
87. The imposition of unwilling government counsel also raises concerns about
inadequate advocacy. In Oregon v. Mitchell, United States Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold defended in court, against his own political view, the constitutional validity of
the Voting Rights Act Amendments. Richard S. Greene, Congressional Power over the
Elective Franchise: The Unconstitutional Phase of Oregon v. Mitchell, 52 B.U.L. REV. 505,
565 (1972) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-28, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970). In a reflection of this apathy, Griswold began his defense of the act by admitting
that the Attorney General could not appear because of previous opposition to the
challenged law, but that "I am here and I and my associates have endeavored to support
the statute as rigorously as we are able." Id. This phenomenon would most likely not
occur in the Proposition 8 litigation as the proponents would, if given standing, intervene
and gladly provide a rigorous defense. Letter Brief of Attorney General Jerry Brown at 4
Beckley v. Schwarzenegger, No. S186072, 2010 Cal. WL 3874716 (September 8, 2010).
88. See supra note 14. The relationship between the executive and legislative
branches within the federal government differs from that in California. In cases where the
President uses his discretion to refuse to defend a law, Congress may employ its own
counsel in defense of the law. 2 U.S.C.A. § 130f(a) (West 2010). When the Carter
administration refused to defend the FCC's position, 2 U.S.C.A. § 130f(a) was not in
effect. Later Congress did hire outside counsel to defend a law when President Barack
Obama's Justice Department would no longer advocate for the Defense of Marriage Act
in court. Windsor v. United States, No 1:10-cv-8435 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
89. Brady, supra note 22, at 974-75. The overriding presumption is that all legislation
is constitutional. Dalena Marcott, The Duty to Defend: What is in the Best Interests of the
World's Most Powerful Client?, 92 GEO. L.J. 1309, 1319-21 (2004).
90. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963).
91 Id.
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discretion.' In the early days of the conflict that would flower into
the landmark United States Supreme Court case FCC v. League of
Women Voters, President Jimmy Carter's Department of Justice sided
with the plaintiffs and refused to defend the FCC's position in court.
This refusal to defend stemmed from the Department of Justice's own
conclusion that the FCC's position, banning local public broadcasters
from editorializing, violated the First Amendment.3 The Carter
administration abandoned its traditional role as defender of federal
law, despite protests from the Senate, the Justice Department's Office
of Legal Counsel, and academia all of which urged that the law was
valid.94 The next president, Ronald Reagan, was more sympathetic to
the FCC's position and revived the litigation vigorously defending the
law all the way to the United States Supreme Court. Although the
Court ultimately struck down the law, not all justices shared President
Carter's view that the act was unconstitutional.95 The four dissenting
justices, saw many reasonable arguments why the FCC's law was
entirely valid.96
D. Reitman v. Mulkey Revisited: Executive Discretion and the
Defense of Direct Democracy in California
Governor Schwarzenegger and Attorney General Brown's
refusals to defend a winning initiative like Proposition 8 have
precedent.97 In both California and neighboring western states that
practice a similar form of direct democracy, executive officers have,
on rare occasions, chosen not to defend initiatives because of their
overriding constitutional concerns.9 8
Proposition 8 was not the first winning initiative opposed during
litigation by the state's Attorney General. Four decades before the
92. Brady, supra note 22, at 974-75; Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32 (1962) (per
curiam).
93. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 371 (1984).
94. Brady, supra note 22, at 975-76 (The Department of Justice claimed that a
reasonable defense could not be made and thus the Code of Professional Responsibility
prevented them from defending the statute in court).
95. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 401(Brennan, J. wrote for the majority in a
5-4 decision.).
96. League of Women Voters at 402-19 (White, J., Burger, J, Stevens J., Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
97. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1977); California Democratic Party v. Lungren, 919 F.Supp. 1397
(N.D. Cal. 1996); League of United Latino Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal.
1995).
98. Id.
controversy over same-sex marriage in California, another
contentious legal struggle pitting the choices of the electorate and the
rights of a minority group against each other."
In 1964, California voters passed Proposition 14 amending their
constitution so to impede any attempts by the Legislature to create
laws that would promote nondiscriminatory practices in the private
housing sector." One year earlier, the California Legislature had
passed the Rumford Fair Housing Act.101 This Act required that
private home sellers and landlords create racially open housing in
their residences and apartments. 2 The Act emboldened a strong
counter-movement in the next year's general election, which pushed
through Proposition 14 by a resounding 2-1 during the subsequent
election."o
In subsequent litigation challenging the validity of Proposition 14
under the United States Constitution, Attorney General Thomas
Lynch and Governor Edmund "Pat" Brown did not support
Proposition 14's addition to their state's constitution." Instead,
Attorney General Lynch filed a brief in opposition to Proposition 14,
urging that the people's enactment violated the Equal Protection
Clause."o" Lynch argued that despite its neutral language, Proposition
14 was motivated by and would perpetuate racial discrimination'
These arguments succeeded, as the United States Supreme Court
struck down Proposition 14 on similar grounds."o
Note that in Reitman, the litigants were private parties and the
validity of Proposition 14 only emerged during summary judgment
proceedings." Subsequently, neither the Attorney General nor the
99. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 371.
100. Id.
101. ALLSWANG, supra note 26, at 74.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 74-75 (In the 1964 election the California Real Estate Association led the
charge to abrogate the Rumford Fair Housing Act through the passage of Proposition 14.
Opposing Proposition 14 stood an amalgamation of Democratic party leadership,
organized labor, churches and members of the Hollywood scene.).
104. Brief of the State of California as Amicus Curiae at 1, Reitman, 387 U.S. 369
(1967) (No. 483).
105. Id. at 1-3.
106. Id. at 9-12 ("This constitutional barrier to such legislature or enactment of
ordinances by local entities in the fair-housing field constitutes an affirmative stand by the
state electorate against fair-housing enactments contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.").
107. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 373.
108. Id. at 372.
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Governor was ever forced to make the fateful choice to refuse to
defend the people's enactment. Still, as a matter concerning the legal
interests of the state, Attorney General Lynch could have petitioned
to be added as a defendant, or submitted an amicus curiae brief and
advocated for will of the majority of the state.'" He did not do this.
Rather, when given the opportunity, the Attorney General decided to
support his view of Equal Protection to the detriment of the electoral
decisions of the majority of Californians.no
E. California Executives did not Abuse their Discretion by Refusing to
Defend Proposition 8 in Appellate Proceedings
Even though the Attorney General and Governor's decision to
support an initiative in court is not ministerial, these officials could
still be liable to a mandamus action if their decision stemmed from an
abuse of their discretionary powers."' In this case, however, no such
abuse of discretion occurred. Foremost and quite obviously so,
Attorney General Brown and Governor Schwarzenegger refused to
appeal the decision in Perry v. Schwarzenegger after the United States
District Court of Northern California had found the initiative
unconstitutional.112 To rely on this decision by the District Court does'
not satisfactorily assess the propriety of the executives' opposition to
Proposition 8, as Attorney General Brown contested the initiative's
validity during both the federal and state challenges."3
In Strauss v. Horton, the California case, Attorney General
Brown opposed Proposition 8 in a brief submitted to the state's
Supreme Court."4 Brown argued that Proposition 8's ban on same-
sex marriage would impose an ultra vires revision to the state's
Constitution abrogating fundamental rights of "safety, happiness, and
109. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12511(West 2011).
110. Brief of the State of California as Amicus Curiae at 4, Reitman, 387 U.S. 369
(1967) (No. 483).
111. See supra note 62.
112. See supra note 9. "[T]he Attorney General has consistently recognized
[Proposition 8's] constitutional deficiency. . . . The United States District Court reached
the same result applying the lens of the federal Constitution." Id. at 1.
113. Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 364 (2009); Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). During Strauss v. Horton, the group that promoted
Proposition 8, ProtectMarriage.com, was allowed to intervene and argue the case.
Interveners' Answer to Amicus Curiae Briefs and Supplemental Response to Pages 75-90
of the Attorney General's Answer Brief at 1 Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364 (2009) (No.
S168047).
114. Attorney General's Response to Amicus Curiae Briefs at 1, Strauss v. Horton, 46
Cal. 4th 364 (2009) (No. S168047).
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privacy" guaranteed by article I, section 1.1' When the validity of
Proposition 8 under the United States Constitution came before the
District Court in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Brown again attacked the
initiative."' He said that he could not support the initiative because
the California Attorney General had a sworn duty to uphold the
United States Constitution and the initiative violated the "supreme
law of the land."n" Specifically, Brown maintained that Proposition
8's prohibition on same-sex marriage violated Due Process and Equal
Protection."
While Proposition 8's ban on same-sex marriage may not be
"clearly unconstitutional" like the "separate but equal" provisions in
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, there exist valid
arguments that this initiative violates the United States Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the freedom to marry
is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause."'
Marriage is also not tied to a couple's capacity to procreate as "it
would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage is simply
about the right to have sexual intercourse." 120 It is unclear whether
the United States Supreme Court would find that existing law
supports the extension of marriage to same-sex couples.'21 The issue
of marriage rights remains one of the great constitutional questions of
our day. In the short term, however, the existing precedents
supporting the extension of marriage to same-sex couples justify the
115. Id. at 4-5. Attorney General Brown's argument in federal court, and the position
ultimately determinative of this official's proper use of his discretion, is the stronger of the
two. In Strauss v. Horton, Brown maintained that an initiative could not abrogate
fundamental rights within the California Constitution, which after In Re Marriage Cases,
included same-sex marriage. Id. at 45. The California Supreme Court rejected this
argument, holding that "no decision suggests that when a constitution has been explicitly
amended to modify a constitutional right" that "the amendment may be found
unconstitutional on the ground that it conflicts with some implicit or extraconstitutional
limitation that is to be framed and enforced by the judiciary." Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 391.
Although the impact of Brown's position in Strauss v. Horton was minimal because the
proponents intervened, this sort of novel argument edged close to an abuse of discretion.
116. Answer of Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr. at 1 Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (2007) (No. 3:09-cv-02292-VRW).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 6.
119. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987).
120. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
121. There are precedents which support the constitutionality of a ban on same-sex
marriage. E.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972).
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discretionary decision by Attorney General Brown and Governor
Schwarzenegger not to defend Proposition 8.
III. Structural Limitations to Executive Discretion
A. The Attorney General May Not Assess an Initiative's Constitutional
Validity when Performing Ministerial Duties to Prepare the
Initiative for the Ballot
In California, the Attorney General must prepare an official
summary of an initiative before it appears on the ballot.122 In the
exercise of this duty, the Attorney General's role is entirely
ministerial and he may not attempt to use this position as a means to
combat proposed initiatives. 123 In Schmitz v. Younger, Attorney
General Evelle Younger refused to grant a title and prepare a
summary for a proposed initiative.124  Despite this clear statutory
direction, Attorney General Younger took a stand against an
initiative. Younger believed this initiative would violate the
requirement that popular enactments only pertain to a single subject
as it would prohibit campaign contributions by teachers'
organizations, outlaw teachers' strikes, and prevent tax revenues from
supporting transportation for the purpose of racially balancing public
schools.125
Despite it being apparent that the proposed initiative spanned
multiple subjects, this decision was not to be made by the Attorney
General under the guise of ministerial obligation.'26 Rather, "[tihe
duty of the Attorney General to prepare title and summary for a
proposed initiative measure is a ministerial one and mandate will lie
to compel him to act when the proposal is in proper form and
complies with statutory and constitutional procedural
requirements." 127 In fulfilling this ministerial responsibility to prepare
prospective initiatives for the ballot, the Attorney General may not
122. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3502, 3503 (West 2011).
123. Schmitz v. Younger, 21 Cal. 3d 90, 92 (1978).
124. Id.; CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3502, 3503 (West 2011).
125. Schmitz, 21 Cal. 3d at 92. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(d) provides that "[a]n initiative
measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have
any effect."
126. Schmitz, 21 Cal. 3d at 92.
127. Id. (While finding the duties to prepare summary and title purely ministerial, the
Schmitz court also noted that "this [ruling] does not mean that the Attorney General may
not challenge the validity of the proposed measure by timely and appropriate legal
action.).
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impute his own opinion about an initiative's constitutional worth and
is susceptible to compulsion by a judicial writ of mandamus if he does
SO.128
B. The Governor Holds the Ultimate Discretion to Determine If an
Initiative Will Be Defended by Government Counsel in Court
In states like California, where executive power is divided among
the independently elected Governor and Attorney General, conflicts
may emerge regarding discretionary decisions to defend an
initiative. 29 Of course, during the Proposition 8 litigation, then
Governor Schwarzenegger and Attorney General Brown shared a
disinclination to defend the initiative and thus no intra-branch dispute
emerged.'30
Still, in a state where the Governor and Attorney General are
both independently elected and quite possibly divided by political,
partisan or personal differences, the prospect of conflict within the
executive branch ever lurks."' Indeed, the California Supreme Court
has already reviewed an instance of discord between the Attorney
General and the Governor concerning the state's position in
litigation.132 In that case, California's highest court held that it is the
Governor who possesses the ultimate discretion to decide whether
the state will defend a law.133
128. Even when ministerial obligations burden the California Attorney General with
mandatory compliance, California Courts have still allowed state executives to exercise a
degree of discretion to prepare summary in any way he sees fit as long as the document
would "reasonably inform the voter of the character and real purpose of the proposed
measure." Lungren v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 48 Cal. App. 4th 435, 443
(1996).
129. William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys
General, And Lessons From the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 (2006) (The
division of executive power between an independently elected governors and attorneys
general in most states is quite different from the federal model where the attorney general
is appointed by the president and serves at his pleasure.).
130. See supra notes 8 and 9.
131. Marshall, supra note 122, at 2453. In states with a divided executive branch,
debilitating conflict has not often materialized. William Marshall attests this cooperation
to the moderating influence of politics. Indeed, "[a] governor who rejects the Attorney
General's position therefore risks expending political capital by appearing reckless, if not
lawless." Conversely, an "Attorney General may also be restrained from overreaching
because she is aware that her role is, in large part, defined by public expectations and that
her primary obligation is to defend, not contradict, the policies of state officers or
agencies, except when those policies violate the law." Id.
132. People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, 29 Cal. 3d 150,158 (1981).
133. Id.
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In People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown, the California Supreme
Court decreed that the Attorney General cannot take a position in
litigation contrary to that of the Governor.'34 The cast in this case is
familiar. In 1977, during Jerry Brown's first term as Governor, the
California Legislature adopted the State Employer-Employee
Relations Act ("SEERA"), a statute which promulgated new rules
for disputes between public employees and their managers. In
response, private citizens contended that SEERA was
unconstitutional and sought to prevent Governor Brown from
enforcing the Act. 36 Soon thereafter, then Attorney General George
Deukmejian also came to the conclusion that SEERA was
constitutionally invalid and attempted to file his own suit seeking
relief similar to that of the original plaintiffs.137
In a sweeping ruling, the California Supreme Court prohibited
Attorney General Deukmejian's attack on SEERA and held that it
was the Governor who has the ultimate discretion to determine
California's position in litigation.13' The court in ex. rel. Deukmejian
relied on the California Constitution's statement that the Attorney
General is "subject to the powers and duties of the Governor" 139 and
subsequently found that if a conflict between the Governor and
Attorney General develops, the Governor retains the ultimate
authority to determine the state's interest.'" In response,
Deukmejian argued that he, as Attorney General, had a common law
right to sue public officials through his role as "the People's legal
counsel" and thus could litigate on behalf of the public interest even if
this view was contrary to the opinions of the Governor. The court
rejected this contention.14' In California, it is the Governor, rather
than the Attorney General, who decides which position the state will
take in court.42
Much of Attorney General Jerry Brown's opposition to
Proposition 8 would not have been possible if Governor
134. Id.
135. Id. at 154.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 158.
139. Id. (referencing CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13).
140. Id. The court also relied upon section 12010 of the California Government Code,
which provides that the "Governor shall supervise the official conduct of all executive and
ministerial officers." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12010 (West 2011).
141. Id. at 157.
142. Id.
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Schwarzenegger had supported the constitutionality of the
initiative.143 Although Attorney General Brown never attempted to
switch sides and act as plaintiff in either Strauss v. Horton or Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, his court filings undisputedly urged that Proposition
8 was unconstitutional." Because Ex. rel. Deukmejian mandates that
the Attorney General be beholden to the Governor's vision of the
constitutionality of state action, Brown would have been unable to
promote this opposition to Proposition 8 if this view had contradicted
with Governor Schwarzenegger's stance.'45
When litigation preferences diverge, the Attorney General is still
free to withdraw from the case and allow lawyers independently
employed by the Governor or a relevant state agency to litigate the
case.'46 An Attorney General's ability to retreat into neutrality is,
however, an entirely different sort of action than an active attack
against a state law. In California, the Attorney General can only
achieve the latter if the Governor approves.
IV. Combating Winning Initiatives by
Executive Interpretation and Appointment
A. Limiting Direct Democracy by Interpretation: Proposition 63, the
English Only Initiative
In California, the Attorney General and Governor may impede a
winning initiative's impact through their own interpretation of the
law's text.147 The saga surrounding the implementation of Proposition
63, The English Only Initiative, demonstrates the power of governors
and attorneys general to thwart the will of direct democracy by this
sort of subtle action."
143. Vikram David Amar, Lessons From California's Recent Experience With Its Non-
Unitary (Divided) Executive: of Mayors, Governors, Controllers, and Attorneys General,
59 EMORY L.J. 469, 487-89 (noting that during In Re Marriage Cases, Attorney General
Jerry Brown filed a brief whose view of Equal Protection differed from that of the
Governor's filing in the case and thus technically violated the holding of Ex rel.
Deukmejian.).
144. See supra notes 112-123.
145. Ex rel. Deukmejian, 29 Cal. 3d at 157-58.
146. D'Amico v. Bd. of Med. Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 15 (1974); CAL.GOv'T CODE §
11040 (West 2011).
147. GERBER, supra note 18, at 21.
148. Id. at 35.
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In 1986, the California electorate overwhelmingly passed
Proposition 63.1'4 This initiative amended the state Constitution by
enshrining English as the official language of California.so Although
the proponents of Proposition 63 were enthusiastic and competent
campaigners, their drafting skills were lacking." The text of
Proposition 63 is vague, only specifying that the Legislature should
take all necessary steps to ensure the role of English as the common
language.'52 Despite these deficiencies, the proponents of Proposition
63 believed the English Only Initiative would have a robust effect on
California. Former United States Senator S. I. Hayakawa, the driving
force behind Proposition 63, had grand plans for laws like the English
Only Initiative, as he believed promoting English as the official
language would combat a "policy of so called 'bilingualism."""
Despite Proposition 63's victory at the polls, the hopes of the
initiative's proponents would be thwarted by California's executive
officers. Upon the passage of Proposition 63, Governor George
Deukmejian refused to say if or how he would enforce this
constitutional amendment, predicting that "many many lawsuits"
would occur.'54
Attorney General John Van de Kamp was more aggressive in his
defiance of the people's initiative. When a dispute concerning the use
of bilingual ballots arose, Van de Kamp issued a research memo in
which he stated that Proposition 63 merely requires voting material
be available in English-rather than in English alone."' This was not
the dream of Hayakawa and his fellow proponents of The English
Only Initiative.' Two years after its passing, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit would admit that Proposition
63 was now merely "a symbolic statement concerning the importance
149. Abbreviated California Ballot Listing, Proposition 63, available at
http://Iibrary.uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/15245/calprop.txt (Seventy-three percent
of the electorate supported Proposition 63.).
150. CAL. CONST. art III, § 6.
151. GERBER, supra note 18, at 35.
152. Id. The drafting of Proposition 63 was so poor that one government official
remarked that its text was "a masterpiece of vagueness." Id.
153. Valerie Lexion, Note, Language Minority Voting Rights and the English Language
Amendment, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 657, 661-62 (1986) (quoting an undated letter
from Senator S. 1. Hayakawa to potential U.S. English supporters during the
Congressional English Language Amendment Hearings in 1983).
154. GERBER, supra note 18, at 35.
155. Barnaby Zall, Official Use of English: Do We Need a Constitutional
Amendment? (Yes), 74 A.B.A. J. 34, 35 (1988).
156. See supra note 155.
of preserving, protecting, and strengthening the English language."1 7
Since then, Proposition 63 has remained on the books serving solely
as a hollow artifact to the powers of hostile executive interpretation.'58
B. Limiting Direct Democracy Through Political Appointment:
Proposition 97, The California Occupational Safety and Health Act
In 1988, the people of California passed Proposition 97, The
California Occupation Safety and Health Act ("Cal-OSHA").'" The
motivation for the people of California to implement this initiative
stemmed from a desire to counter the policies of then Governor
George Deukmejian. One year earlier, Governor Deukmejian had
eliminated funding for an earlier iteration of Cal-OSHA.'" These
actions by the Governor enraged many Californians and these
citizens would subsequently band together to promote "the superior
protections of Cal-OSHA.""' Their efforts through direct democracy
led to the passing of Proposition 97, an initiative which required the
Governor to fully fund the Cal-OSHA program.162
Upon Proposition 97's ascension into California law, Governor
Deukmejian immediately stated that he would abide by the voter's
decision and revive Cal-OSHA to its previous splendor.'63 These
public affirmations of support for Proposition 97 did not, however,
reflect the actions Deukmejian took behind the scenes.'" Throughout
the Deukmejian governorship the reconstituted agency operated with
a reduced number of employees and completed twenty-four percent
fewer inspections than it had before Deukmejian first reduced the
agency's funds.'
157. Gutierrez v. Mun. Court of Se. Jud. Dist., L.A. Cnty, 838 F.2d 1031, 1044 (9th Cir.
1988) cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Mun. Court of Se. Judicial Dist., County
of Los Angeles v. Gutierrez, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
158. Frank M. Lowrey, IV, Through the Looking Glass: Linguistic Separatism and
National Unity, 41 EMORY L.J. 223, 293-94 (1992).
159. Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 737-40 (9th Cir. 1992) (providing a factual
summary of the political events surrounding Proposition 97).
160. Cabrera, 973 F.2d at 737-40.
161. Text of Proposition 97, California Ballot Pamphlet, General Election (Nov. 8,
1988), available at http://traynor.uchastings.edulballot-pdf/1988g.pdf.
162. Abbreviated California Ballot Listing, Proposition 97, available at
http://holmes.uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/24830/calprop.txt (Proposition 97 claimed
the support of approximately fifty-four percent of the electorate).
163. ELISABETH R. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE: How STATE
GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY 40 (2001).
164. Id.
165. Id.
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Most notably, Governor Deukmejian appointed two members to
the Cal-OSHA' board who had previously opposed funding the
agency.'6 With his ability to appoint officials to positions of power
within Cal-OSHA, Governor Deukmejian publicly complied with the
letter of Proposition 97 while still directing policy in a manner that
more closely mirrored his intent than that of Proposition 97's
167supporters. Through the state's system of direct democracy, the
people of California had attempted to bolster Cal-OSHA by passing
Proposition 97. And as a reward for their efforts, they received
neither their desired policy nor even the consolation of being able to
hold an elected executive directly responsible for this lack of
compliance.
V. The Exercise of an Executive's Discretion to Defend
Provides an Opportunity for Democratic Accountability
No doubts remain as to which side of the Rubicon Attorney
General Jerry Brown and Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger stood
when they decided to counter the will of the electorate and not
defend Proposition 8 in court.'" Because of their shared belief that
Proposition 8 violates the Equal Protection Clause and guarantees of
Due Process within the United States Constitution, the Governor and
Attorney General refused to support a law promulgated by the voice
of direct democracy.16 1 Such action was not ignored by the political
realm. In the days leading up to the decision in Beckley v.
Schwarzenegger, fellow Republicans voiced their displeasure towards
Governor Schwarzenegger and urged that only he could allow the
question of Proposition 8's constitutionality to ascend to the appellate
level.170 Schwarzenegger was not swayed and continued to withhold
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More notably, the question of the proper scope of the executives'
discretion to defend emerged as a key political issue in the statewide
electoral campaigns for Attorney General and Governor in late 2010.
During the campaign, Attorney General candidate Steve Cooley and
gubernatorial hopeful Meg Whitman both announced that they would
appeal the ruling in Perry v. Schwarzenegger if elected.1 12 Conversely
their respective opponents, Kamala Harris and Jerry Brown, to no
one's surprise, adverted that they would continue to refuse to defend
Proposition 8 in court."3 With each candidate staking a position on
the issue of executive discretion to defend Proposition 8, California's
voters were able substantively assess those who would claim the
mantle of executive power accountable for their views on the rights
guaranteed by the United States and California Constitutions.174 This
was a privilege which the voters interested in the outcome of
Proposition 97 and Proposition 63 never enjoyed.
This specter of political accountability is real. California's
electorate has before punished a sitting Governor for failing to
vigorously defend a popularly enacted initiative in court."' In 1994,
the people of California passed Proposition 187: The Save Our State
Initiative."' This initiative required government officials to verify the
immigration status of persons with whom they came into contact and
deny those living in the country illegally access to nonemergency
healthcare, social services and education.177
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Although this initiative passed by a comfortable margin of fifty-
nine percent to forty-one percent, the campaign was fierce.
Supporters of Proposition 187 characterized as the initiative as the
only solution to illegal immigration, while opponents utilized the
campaign to mobilize a disenfranchised minority.179  "White voters
supported the initiative by about a two-to-one ratio while Latinos
voters opposed the new law by over a three-to-one margin.""
Among the opponents of Proposition 187 was then California State
Controller and future Governor Gray Davis who would later declare
that if Proposition 187 were "a piece of legislation he would have
vetoed it."""
The opponents of Proposition 187 did not rest after their defeat
at the ballot box. The day after Proposition 187 became California
law, opponents of the initiative filed five federal lawsuits alleging that
the new law was unconstitutional.1 82 Eventually the various lawsuits
were consolidated into a single case, League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Wilson, which pitted opponents of the initiative
against then Governor Pete Wilson, as the representative of
California's government. The District Court would find that the
majority of Proposition 187 violated the United States Constitution.
Among Proposition 187's many original sections, only the bar to
granting illegal immigrants higher education benefits and new
criminal punishments for forging immigration documents remained."
Governor Wilson was ready to appeal the District Court's
findings and stated that he would advocate for Proposition 187's
constitutionality all the way to the United States Supreme Court.18
Wilson, however, never had the opportunity to participate in this
fight. Before the appeal could be completed, he lost the Governor's
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Office to Gray Davis, a politician who had previously opposed
Proposition 187."6
Upon taking office, Davis became responsible for determining
California's appellate response in League of United Latin American
Citizens. He chose an unfamiliar route. Instead of pursing a
traditional appeal, as former Governor Wilson would surely have
done, Davis elected to take advantage of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals' Settlement Program to mediate the dispute over Proposition
187.1' Before the mediation began, Davis made overtures to the
proponents of Proposition 187 to include their perspective. The
political divergence between Davis and the proponents was, however,
too great and the supporters of Proposition 187 refused to participate
in the negotiations. Instead, the proponents appealed to the
California Supreme Court to halt the mediation of their favored
initiative. The California Supreme Court denied their request
unanimously, keeping the fate of Proposition 187 out of the hands of
the citizens who supported it most.'8
Over three months, the Governor's representatives and the
plaintiffs negotiated with the aid of the Ninth Circuit's Settlement
Program. By all accounts, the mediation was fruitful and both sides
reported that they had moved from their initial positions.189 Still, the
final result did not please the citizen proponents of Proposition 187.
The settlement agreement upheld the District Court's decision in
striking down of the majority of Proposition 187's restrictions on
granting services to illegal immigrants. In fact, the agreement went
even further than the District Court's decision, mandating that illegal
immigrants could receive post-secondary education benefits in
California. In exchange for abandoning the major of Proposition
187's provisions, the plaintiffs agreed to drop all litigation and allow
the remaining sections to become law. This was not much of a
compromise. The only sections of Proposition 187 which survived the
mediation were the minor criminal provisions outlawing the
manufacturing and distribution of false immigration documents.'9o
The mediation of Proposition 187, instigated by Governor Davis, was
a victory for those who opposed the popularly enacted initiative.
186. Id. at 148.
187. Id. at 169. Proposition 187 was the first and so far only dispute concerning a
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California voters did not forgive Davis' discretionary decision to
abandon a rigorous defense of an initiative in court. In 2003, Davis
became the first California Governor to suffer from the other great
prong of the state's system of direct democracy and be recalled by the
electorate. One third of those who voted to oust Davis admitted that
the Governor's lenient stance toward illegal immigration, exemplified
by his refusal to defend Proposition 187 in court, motivated them to
remove him from office.191
Conclusion
It has been one hundred years since the reforms of the
Progressive Movement brought direct democracy to California."
Since then, the people have zealously wielded this privilege and
implemented a wide variety of initiatives into California law. 93 The
Progressive's dream of an electorate empowered to create laws
unadulterated by the influence of elected officials has, however, not
been entirely realized. Today, California's Governor and Attorney
General still possess much constitutional authority to limit the impact
of a winning initiative.94
Chief among these discretionary abilities is the executives'
prerogative to decline to defend against a legal challenge.'95 While
this power is great, its use does not come cheap. By refusing to
defend an enactment of the people, California's executives are openly
subduing democratic choices in favor of their own vision of
fundamental protections.'" Unlike instances of hostile executive
interpretation or appointment, a refusal to defend an initiative during
litigation does not permit the Governor or Attorney General to
appease the electorate with empty statements of support.'" Instead,
this bare assertion of a Governor or Attorney General's true
constitutional colors provides the people with a clear message with
which to hold these politicians accountable during the next election.!
After a century of direct democracy, California's electorate,
Governor and Attorney General have each claimed a share of the
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ability to shape the fundamental laws of the state. In the end, the
California Constitution belongs to them all.
